The New York Times
News Analysis
Nov. 9, 2006
By Michael R. Gordon
WASHINGTON, Nov. 8 — From the day he took control at the Pentagon, Donald H. Rumsfeld was determined to reassert civilian control of the defense establishment and create a leaner, more lethal American military.
With President Bush’s endorsement, he pursued his goals with a vengeance, emerging as the most powerful secretary of defense since Robert S. McNamara more than three decades earlier.
Like his predecessor, Mr. Rumsfeld was undone by policies that resulted in a quagmire in a distant land. The defense secretary’s resistance to deploying a large number of troops in Iraq, his skepticism of nation-building and his reluctance to acknowledge a potent insurgency made an already challenging situation all the more difficult. As the turmoil grew in Iraq, the defense secretary who once described himself as “genetically impatient” and a force for change was slow to adapt.
“The ironic thing is that he may end up being criticized for not being more on top of Iraq,” said Eliot A. Cohen, a military historian and professor at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies of Johns Hopkins University. “Blame needs to be shared all around on Iraq, but he bears his share of responsibility by not being willing to make the kinds of corrections early on that were necessary.”
Mr. Rumsfeld did not acknowledge missteps on Iraq in his appearance with President Bush on Wednesday, but obliquely accepted that he had become a lightning rod for criticism of the war. Paraphrasing Winston Churchill, he said, “I have benefited greatly from criticism, and at no time have I suffered a lack thereof.”
Mr. Rumsfeld came to the Pentagon as a consummate insider. Among an array of important government posts, he had been defense secretary under President Ford, developing a reputation as a ruthlessly effective bureaucratic infighter.
After a career as a corporate chief executive, he returned to the Pentagon after George W. Bush was elected president. Mr. Bush had vowed during his campaign to appoint a powerful defense secretary with a mandate to overhaul the American military. Mr. Rumsfeld was to be that man.
At the Pentagon, Mr. Rumsfeld’s program was called “transformation,” and it acquired the status of an official ideology. Mr. Rumsfeld was enamored of missile defense and space-based systems, issues he had worked on during his years out of office. Like many conservatives, he was wary about the Army leadership, which he considered to be too wedded to heavy forces and too slow to change.
In his trademark blunt style, Mr. Rumsfeld convened a Pentagon “town hall” meeting on Sept. 10, 2001. “The topic today is an adversary that poses a threat, a serious threat, to the security of the United States of America,” he pronounced. “It’s the Pentagon bureaucracy.”
After the terror attacks in Washington and New York the next day, Mr. Rumsfeld focused on the new war on terrorism. The defense secretary was a solid ally of Vice President Dick Cheney, who worked for Mr. Rumsfeld during the Nixon and Ford years. And he soon emerged as a spokesman for the administration’s national security policies, presiding over news conferences at which he issued pithy observations about the need to be prepared for the “unknown unknowns.”
Within the military establishment, however, the defense secretary quickly became a contentious figure as his penchant for hands-on management and his theories on military transformation were given a field test. Mr. Rumsfeld did not decide how many troops would be deployed for the war in Iraq, but he helped pick the generals who did. He never hesitated to push, prod and ask questions to shape their recommendations.
It was Mr. Rumsfeld who complained that the plan for invading and securing Iraq that had been left behind by Gen. Anthony C. Zinni, Tommy Franks’s predecessor at the United States Central Command, called for more troops. As many as 500,000 troops would be sent to secure Iraq. Mr. Rumsfeld dismissed it as old thinking, according to retired Lt. Gen. Greg Newbold.
According to General Franks, Mr. Rumsfeld was the impetus behind one of the most contentious decisions of the war: canceling the deployment of the First Cavalry Division, which was to reinforce the initial invasion force. That left the American military with fewer troops as the insurgency was beginning to develop.
It was also Mr. Rumsfeld who insisted that the Pentagon take the lead in overseeing postwar planning and the administration of Iraq in the first critical months of the occupation after the ouster of Saddam Hussein from power. When Baghdad was gripped by looting in April 2003, the defense secretary dismissed the disorder as little more than the pent-up frustrations of an oppressed people: “Stuff happens.”
According to L. Paul Bremer III, the American civilian administrator in Iraq, and his aides, Mr. Rumsfeld was consulted on the controversial decision to formally disband the Iraqi Army.
Iraq, of course, is just part of Mr. Rumsfeld’s legacy. In terms of his management style, he clearly succeeded in consolidating his authority as defense secretary. More than any of his predecessors, Mr. Rumsfeld influenced the appointment of three- and four-star officers, installing military leaders whom he could count on to carry out his agenda. But senior officers complained that his insistence on loyalty came at a cost: a dearth of senior officers willing to offer independent advice.
In terms of his transformation agenda, Mr. Rumsfeld enjoyed, at best, mixed success. He overhauled the cold-war-era system of military bases around the world, a decision that has led to the reduction in American forces in Europe and Korea. He also insisted on greater cooperation among the military services.
“On the positive side he brought the armed forces to a much higher degree of joint thinking and integration,” said Barry M. Blechman, a member of the Defense Policy Board, which advises Mr. Rumsfeld, and the president of DFI International, a consulting firm.
Still, despite Mr. Rumsfeld’s avowed intention to challenge orthodox Pentagon thinking, few major weapons programs were canceled and the military’s force structure and spending patterns were not radically altered.
“At the end of the day you would have to say that for Rumsfeld, transformation was more promise than reality,” said Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr., the executive director of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. “He made a start, but these things take time, and it is clear now that Iraq has denied him that time.”
Army Times
Editorial
Nov. 4, 2006
“So long as our government requires the backing of an aroused and informed public opinion ... it is necessary to tell the hard bruising truth.”
That statement was written by Pulitzer Prize-winning war correspondent Marguerite Higgins more than a half-century ago during the Korean War.
But until recently, the “hard bruising” truth about the Iraq war has been difficult to come by from leaders in Washington.
One rosy reassurance after another has been handed down by President Bush, Vice President Cheney and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld: “mission accomplished,” the insurgency is “in its last throes,” and “back off,” we know what we’re doing, are a few choice examples.
Military leaders generally toed the line, although a few retired generals eventually spoke out from the safety of the sidelines, inciting criticism equally from anti-war types, who thought they should have spoken out while still in uniform, and pro-war foes, who thought the generals should have kept their critiques behind closed doors.
Now, however, a new chorus of criticism is beginning to resonate. Active-duty military leaders are starting to voice misgivings about the war’s planning, execution and dimming prospects for success.
Army Gen. John Abizaid, chief of U.S. Central Command, told a Senate Armed Services Committee in September: “I believe that the sectarian violence is probably as bad as I’ve seen it ... and that if not stopped, it is possible that Iraq could move towards civil war.”
Last week, someone leaked to The New York Times a Central Command briefing slide showing an assessment that the civil conflict in Iraq now borders on “critical” and has been sliding toward “chaos” for most of the past year. The strategy in Iraq has been to train an Iraqi army and police force that could gradually take over for U.S. troops in providing for the security of their new government and their nation.
But despite the best efforts of American trainers, the problem of molding a viciously sectarian population into anything resembling a force for national unity has become a losing proposition.
For two years, American sergeants, captains and majors training the Iraqis have told their bosses that Iraqi troops have no sense of national identity, are only in it for the money, don’t show up for duty and cannot sustain themselves.
Meanwhile, colonels and generals have asked their bosses for more troops. Service chiefs have asked for more money.
And all along, Rumsfeld has assured us that things are well in hand.
Now, the president says he’ll stick with Rumsfeld for the balance of his term in the White House.
This is a mistake. It is one thing for the majority of Americans to think Rumsfeld has failed. But when the nation’s current military leaders start to break publicly with their defense secretary, then it is clear that he is losing control of the institution he ostensibly leads.
These officers have been loyal public promoters of a war policy many privately feared would fail. They have kept their counsel private, adhering to more than two centuries of American tradition of subordination of the military to civilian authority.
And although that tradition, and the officers’ deep sense of honor, prevent them from saying this publicly, more and more of them believe it.
Rumsfeld has lost credibility with the uniformed leadership, with the troops, with Congress and with the public at large. His strategy has failed, and his ability to lead is compromised. And although the blame for our failures in Iraq rests with the secretary, it will be the troops who bear its brunt.
This is not about the midterm elections. Regardless of which party wins Nov. 7, the time has come, Mr. President, to face the hard bruising truth:
Donald Rumsfeld must go.
Below is the response to the Army Times editorial by the Department of Defense.
United States Department of Defense For The Record Nov. 5, 2006
The editorial included a number of inaccurate and misleading statements.
HERE ARE THE FACTS:
THE ADMINISTRATION HAS PROVIDED A BALANCED PICTURE: Despite what the editorial claims, the Department has always attempted to clearly and accurately describe the challenges our forces face in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Secretary above all has always been very measured in describing the progress U.S forces are making in what will undoubtedly be a long struggle in the War on Terror...(Read More)
Globe and Mail (Canada)
Nov. 9, 2006
By Associated Press
Washington — U.S. Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld acknowledged Thursday progress in the Iraq war has not been going “well enough or fast enough” in his first extended remarks since announcing his resignation under political pressure.
Mr. Rumsfeld said little about his impending departure when speaking to a friendly audience of students, teachers and military personnel at Kansas State University...(Read More)
Buenos Aires Herald
Herald Staff with AP and Reuters
Nov. 9, 2006
"Look, this is a close election. If you look at race by race, it was close. The cumulative effect, however, was not too close. It was a thumping," he said.
He quickly announced the resignation of Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, whose removal had long been demanded by Democrats, while insisting the decision for him to leave had been made before Election Day...(Read More)
The Hindu (India)
By Atul Aneja
DUBAI: A large section of Iraqis have welcomed the resignation of U.S. Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, one of the key architects of the war in Iraq.
Mohammed Dayini, a spokesman for the Sunni National Dialogue Council, said Mr. Rumsfeld should have resigned much earlier. "He is the one responsible for the criminal acts at Abu Ghraib and the thousands of innocent Iraqis who have died at the hands of the US," he said...(Read More)
Asahi Shimbun (Japan)
Nov. 10, 2006
Reacting to the sudden resignation of U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Japan made clear Thursday it is committed to assisting in Iraq's reconstruction and implementing the planned U.S. military realignment here.
While Rumsfeld's departure prompted officials in Tokyo to ponder the ramifications, Chief Cabinet Secretary Yasuhisa Shiozaki touched on concerns Thursday over a plan to relocate the functions of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma in Ginowan, Okinawa Prefecture, to Nago in another part of the prefecture...(Read More)
Daily Nation (Kenya)
Nov. 11, 2006
By Reuters
Robert Gates, President Bush’s new nominee as US Secretary of Defence, is no stranger to controversy on Capitol Hill. His last nomination, for CIA chief in 1991, produced a gruelling though ultimately successful confirmation battle.
But some who voted against him before – in part to protest against what they said was his selective memory about past scandal – said yesterday they were willing to consider his qualifications to replace Donald Rumsfeld at the Pentagon...(Read More)
Mail & Guardian (South Africa)
Nov. 8, 2006
By Stephen Collinson
United States Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld resigned on Wednesday, paying the price for the Democrat surge to power in Congress driven by a wave of public anger over the Iraq war.
President George Bush announced the veteran power broker's departure, sending shockwaves though Washington, in a move that could possibly pave the way to a major change of US strategy in the strife-torn nation...(Read More)
The Independent (United Kingdom)
Nov. 9, 2006
By Rupert Cornwell
Donald Rumsfeld, the beleaguered US Defence Secretary, resigned yesterday, hours after a sweeping Democratic victory in midterm elections that redraw the balance of political power in Washington and could presage major changes in policy over Iraq.
The electoral defeat had made Mr Rumsfeld's position all but untenable, given the criticism raining upon him not only from the resurgent Democrats but also from senior members of the Republican Party. But its timing was a shock - only days after Mr Bush had vowed to keep the Pentagon chief in place until the end of his term in January 2009...(Read More)
Der Spiegel (Germany)
Nov. 9, 2006
By Matthias Gebauer
Donald Rumsfeld was the oldest and the most controversial member of the Bush administration. Now he's being made a scapegoat for the Iraq disaster and has to go. His mission to radically reorganize the US armed forces has failed. His huge mistakes will continue to haunt Bush.
Donald Rumsfeld liked to cultivate the legend of himself as a tough warrior. On the morning of Sept. 11, 2001 -- a plane had just crashed into the Pentagon -- the defense secretary ignored the warnings of his anxious security advisors and ordered his staff to remain in their offices until the end. He only allowed people to leave when the smoke had become too thick to breathe. The message of this often-told anecdote: The captain is the last to leave the ship...(Read More)
Jerusalem Post
Nov. 9, 2006
By Matthew E. Berger
US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld resigned Wednesday, a day after an American electorate, frustrated with the progress of the war in Iraq, elected a Democratic leadership in the House of Representatives and at least a half-share of the Senate.
President George W. Bush announced Rumsfeld's resignation at a press conference Wednesday, and said he had asked Robert Gates, the former director of the Central Intelligence Agency, to replace him...(Read More)
Al Jazeera (Qatar)
Nov. 9, 2006
By Al Jazeera and Agencies
Speaking at a White House press conference on Wednesday, George Bush, the president, said Rumsfeld was a patriot who had "served his country with honour and distinction" but recognised that a change was needed at the Pentagon.
"After a series of thoughtful conversations, secretary Rumsfeld and I agreed that the timing is right for new leadership," Bush said...(Read More)
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