B. R. Ambedkar: Reconstructing the World

By Owen M. Lynch

This was a book review of Reconstructing the World: B. R. Ambedkar and Buddhism in India that appeared in The Journal of Asian Studies 64, no. 2 (May 2005): 497-499. I’m posting it since it’s relevant to my blog series “The Oppression of Shudras/Dalits in India: A Marxist and Hindu Liberationist Perspective.” This should explain better to those readers out there who are curious but who don’t know who Dr. Bhimrao Ramji Ambedkar is.

The views and opinions expressed in this essay do not necessarily reflect those of the creator of this blog and are the sole responsibility of the author. Essays expressing opinions similar to and counter to those of the creator of this blog are strictly for diversity and to start thoughtful and meaningful discussion.

Reconstructing the World: B. R. Ambedkar and Buddhism in India. Edited by Surendra Jondhale and Johannes Beltz. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2004.viii, 316 pp. Rs 995 (cloth).

Dr. B. R. Ambedkar, a Dalit (ex-Untouchable) and major architect of India's constitution, was arguably India's greatest modern intellectual. His social and political writings and ideas have become more influential today than when they were first written. Just before his 1956 death, Ambedkar completed his own interpretation of Buddhism, The Buddha and His Dhamma (Bombay: Siddharth Publication, 4th ed. 1991), "the" sacred book for many of his followers today. Reconstructing the World: B. R. Ambedkar and Buddhism in India's fifteen authors-too many for separate mention in eight hundred words-make a major contribution insofar as they synthesize, contextualize, and explain Ambedkar's interpretation of Buddhism and thereby demolish some of the many misunderstandings and misrepresentations of his thought.

A reader might read Yashwant Sumant's article first because it best summarizes Ambedkar's thoughts on religion and Buddhism. Sumant demonstrates how Ambedkar, a rationalist, concluded that so-called popular religions surrender reason to transcendental gods and dogmas. They thereby separate themselves from morality, as does Hinduism's rejection of liberty, equality, and freedom, and its unjust treatment of Dalits through its practice of graded inequality. Contrariwise, Ambedkar's rationalist Buddhism is a this-worldly social praxis, a morality rejecting all social barriers. For these reasons, as Johannes Beltz's article shows, many Dalits today reject Hinduism and convert to Buddhism.

Ambedkar's Buddhism is often pejoratively called "neo-Buddhism." That implies that Dalit Buddhists are still Hindus, a judgment that they reject in their own sense of identity (Beltz, p. 261). "Neo-Buddhism" also implies departure from traditional Buddhism because it rejects the four noble truths as pessimistic and denying hope to humans rather than providing motivation to change their everyday life's conditions through Buddhist social praxis. Pradeep Gokhale's article, however, responds that even if Ambedkar's Buddhism is a reconstruction of traditional Buddhism, "it may or may not be so for original Buddhism" (p. 124). Moreover, Christopher Queen's article convincingly argues that activist Buddhists in Southeast Asia and elsewhere have used mass media, public relations, and legislation to pursue this-worldly change, yet they are not labeled with the prefix "neo." Rather, Queen demonstrates that Ambedkar's transformations retain "the central elements of the Buddhist vision" (p. 146). More telling are Adèle Fiske and Christoph Emmerich, who, following Richard Gombrich, argue that "orthodoxy is by far the lesser issue in the history of ruptures within the Buddhist tradition compared to the role of orthopraxy. ... If Ambedkar departed from any Buddhist tradition, it was on the grounds of a challenge to orthopraxy through his own ideas of political and social practice" (p. 112).

Gary Tartakov's article notes that Ambedkar called his Buddhism Navayana (p. 152). Navayana is not "neo"; it is a fourth vehicle (yana) among Buddhism's traditional three. Ambedkar's Buddhism, as many of the book's authors argue, is based on a deep study of Buddhist texts and scholarly writings about them, just as The Buddha and His Dhamma is organized around a profound understanding of events in the Buddha's life, as Eleanor Zelliot's article notes. Many of the book's authors argue that Ambedkar did not intend Navayâna for Dalits only. He meant it as a universal message for all humanity. Its goal is individual and collective emancipation from nonrational thought, economic exploitation, and unjust social difference.

A keyword in Ambedkar's Buddhist discourse is "justice," meaning liberty, equality, and fraternity. Some, therefore, say that Navayâna is mostly repackaged Western liberal thought. Yet, Ambedkar said that he had learned everything about those words' meaning from the Buddha. Eugenia Yurolova's article, like Olivier Herrenschmidt's, adverts to Ambedkar's statement that equality has no value without liberty and fraternity, that the three must coexist and do so only by following the Budhha's way. Ambedkar, Yurolova says, felt that democracy was the best form of government but not in its Western form, in which liberty had swallowed equality, producing class difference and a market ideologically supported by social Darwinism (pp. 86-92). In this reviewer's opinion, Ambedkar's views here resonate loudly in contemporary India's struggle between meritocracy (liberty) and reservations (equality and freedom).

Reconstructing the World's second major contribution is its introducing readers to late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Buddhist movements among Dalits other than Ambedkar's Buddhism. G. Aloysius's article succinctly illuminates Pandit Iyothee Thass's 1898 establishment in Tamilnadu of Sakya, later the South Indian Buddhist movement. While similar to Ambedkar's Buddhism in ideas and goals, it tantalizingly differed in one respect. Sakya had an earthbound transcendent God: "[A]Il those men and women who followed the path of righteousness and wisdom and lived a life of total selflessness, and thus through their own character, conduct and life-contribution had become indispensable to and immortal in the lives of successive generations" (p. 212).

Maren Bellwinkel's revealing article narrates historical Buddhist influences in Uttar Pradesh. In Kanpur, Archarya Ishvardatt Medharthi (1900-1971) tried to reconcile Buddhism with the sant tradition, while in Lucknow, Bodhanand Mahastavir (1874-1952) established a Buddhist temple and advocated for Dalits. His followers founded the press influential among Dalits, Bahujan Kalyan Prakashan, and actively participated in Ambedkar's Republican Party of India. Also around 1937, two Sri Lankan-trained but Western-born monks made a missionary visit to Kanpur. Finally, in 1981 Kanpur's newly formed Dalit Panthers organized its first mass conversion to Ambedkar's Buddhism.

Reconstructing the World offers stimulating and provocative analyses of Ambedkar's religious legacy: Buddhism's contemporary revival in India and its universal relevance for humanity.

Copyright Association for Asian Studies, Inc. May 2005

China’s New Interest In Africa, Symbiotic or Parasitic?

By Rorik Strindberg

The views and opinions expressed in this essay do not necessarily reflect those of the creator of this blog and are the sole responsibility of the author. Essays expressing opinions similar to and counter to those of the creator of this blog are strictly for diversity and to start thoughtful and meaningful discussion.

In the October 28 2006 issue of the Economist, there is an article titled, “China in Africa; Never to late to scramble.” The second halve is a direct reference to the scramble for Africa, which occurred after the Berlin Conference in 1884-1885. Although this is a direct reference to the “New Imperialism” or often known as “Empire for Empire’s sake,” Chinese ambitions in Africa seem to be in concert more with the imperial ambitions of the first wave of imperialism. The best example of the first wave of imperialism is Great Britain’s involvement in India, dating form the 17th century to the 20th century. Is this the path that the Chinese will fallow in Africa?

British involvement in Indian was initially simply economic. The English (1) desired to initially purchase Indian goods, silks, clothing, ect. The Mughal Empire, the Muslim rulers of India left in place after the fall of the Mongolian Empire, had allowed the British and others to trade in modern India. It is important to note that England initially simply did not have the power to “take over” the Mughal Empire. Treaties with the Dutch, after the Anglo-Dutch merger when William of Orange became the king of England, the English and the Dutch agreed to give the English control of the Indian Trade and the Dutch control of Indonesia. The next step towards English control of India was to get the French out of India, which was accomplished after the Seven Years War, or as we call it in America the French and Indian (Native American Indian) War. After an English victory, the French were expelled from India. The most important idea of English Imperialism in India is that it evolved slowly. Initially it would have been absurd to even think that the tiny nation like England could ever control the Mughal Empire. As the Mughal Empire began to crumble the British begin to assume more and more of the role of the government, to maintain the trade. After the Napoleonic wars from 1792-1815, when the British were excluded from trade with the European Continent, industrialization picked up speed. After this period the British needed markets to export their industrial products to, and places to get raw materials from. This fact greatly increased the rational and rate of imperialism.

A similar process occurred in Egypt with the British and in Mexico with the French. Both Egypt and Mexico had a history of reneging on debts. To solve this Egypt became a protectorate of Britain, where British forced the Egyptians to pay off their debts. In Mexico, the French imposed Maximilian as Emperor of Mexico for the same purposes.

Back to China and Africa. Although China has been involved in Africa since it begin to export Maoism to Africa in the 1950’s, recently China is more involved in Africa and will be increasingly in the future. Africa-China trade in 1995 was just 3 billion dollars, and now has multiplied by just under a factor of eleven to 32 billion dollars. China now accounts for 10% of African trade, although this figure is expected to double by 2010. China is primarily interested in Africa as markets to export surplus goods, and importing raw materials. China needs minerals, farm products, timber and oil. (2) Many African Nations are elated by the idea of trading with China, for Western traders, the IMF and Paris Club, are constantly pestering African Nations over, corruption, torture, democracy, and the lack of accountability. The Chinese simply are not concerned with such nuances that only get in the way of making money. For example, when Canadian and American Firms left Sudan because of domestic backlash of dealing with the greatest human rights of the 21st century, Chinese state-owned firms quickly replaced them. Now Sudan virtually has UN veto power through China to any action in the Darfur. China is also building armament factories in Sudan.

A little side note, it dose not matter how many lighters are held up at a rock concert, China and Sudan will not stop the killing. (3) The only way to stop the killing would be to have a whole lot of US Marines show up at President Omar al-Bashir’s front door. Who knows what kind of mess that would create?

Although China invests money in Africa, it really does little good. Most of the jobs that are created are for Chinese workers. This includes many of the railroads that the Chinese are building in Africa in turn for oil. Also, many of the cheaper Chinese products are displacing African businesses; there is a detailed description of in the article of a shop owner in Angola that can not do business any more because of Chinese competition. Also in Thomas Freidman’s The World is Flat, there is a detailed description of how cheaper Chinese plastic lanterns are replacing the ones previously made by Egyptians. One really has to wonder if this is a symbiotic relationship or a parasitic relationship.
In the defense of the Chinese, one also has to look at the money lent and aid by America and Europe to Africa. American Aid to Africa has to employ American not African Firms and most of the European Aid to Africa ends up back in the hands of the Europeans. This is in the forms of Swiss Bank Accounts and European luxury items. Although, most of the Western money at least has good intentions, like the World Bank’s plan for Chad. This is where World Bank president Paul Wolfowitz proposed to lend Chad money at a low interest rate, so that they could build an oil pipeline. The money was lent on the basis that a large percent of the oil money would be reinvested in the people of Chad. The President of Chad spent all of the money on the military.
There are other models for African nations to fallow. Botswana and South Africa posses a GDP per capita that are about the same as Russia and are higher then Mexico, Brazil, India and China. Botswana since 1966 has the one of the highest growth rates. Many attribute this to parliamentary government and fiscal discipline. One dose not have to sleep with the devil for profit.

In conclusion I will admit that I am a Sinophobe, and this should be taken into account when you read my articles. I find their state offensive, as one Chinese activist said; China represents the worst of Capitalism and Communism. Also, China executes more criminals per year then the rest of the world combined, and sell their body parts on the black market. This is what their government really dose. (4) This is neglecting numerous other human rights violation committed by the Chinese State, for the sake of time. One really has to wonder do the Africans really know what they are getting into with China. One can see how easily trade involves into outright colonialism. I wonder what will happen when African nations renege on their debts to China or the security situation in Africa prevents China from getting its oil. Can you say Imperialism?

Footnotes

1. I switch between England and Britain because the union of England and Scotland forms Great Britain and to refer to Britain before 1707 is incorrect.

2. Economist, 53

3. This is a program that I am highly critical of that always appears on Myspace.com

4. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4921116.stm

The Groot Krokodil Will Bite No More

By Joseph Gregory

This was an article that I read in the Sowetan but originally appeared (in a fuller version) in the New York Times on Wednesday Nov. 1.

The views and opinions expressed in this essay do not necessarily reflect those of the creator of this blog and are the sole responsibility of the author. Essays expressing opinions similar to and counter to those of the creator of this blog are strictly for diversity and to start thoughtful and meaningful discussion.

PW Botha, who died on Tuesday at the age of 90 at his home in George, struggled vainly to preserve apartheid rule in a tide of domestic racial violence and global condemnation.

Botha was a son of a well-to-do Afrikaner farm family who dropped out of university to work for the right-wing National Party. He gained a reputation as the “Great Crocodile” for his ability to charm, outwit and crush his opponents.

In 1978 Botha became prime minister and proceeded to engineer the creation of a new constitution: one that limited reform of apartheid policies and paved the way for him to become president in 1984.

Though the constitution allowed Asians and coloureds to be represented in a white-controlled parliament, it continued to exclude the black majority.

Some apartheid laws, like a prohibition on mixed marriages and a requirement that blacks carry special passes, were relaxed. But the measures only fuelled the anger of apartheid’s opponents.

Holding out the promise that apartheid would eventually be dismantled, he opened negotiations with Nelson Mandela. The talks went nowhere and Mandela remained confined.

At the same time, Botha, who first achieved prominence as minister of defence, gave the police and military unprecedented power.

Mr. Botha used the climate of the cold war to justify his actions. He portrayed a growing Marxist threat in southern Africa and warned that Communists had infiltrated the anti-apartheid movement at home. South Africa, he said, was engaged in a “total war” and must develop a “total strategy” to fight the battle.

His government repressed dissent, encouraged rivalries among different tribes and ethnic groups, and tried to destabilise neighbouring countries opposed to the system of white rule.

As opposition to apartheid spread, Botha’s room for manoeuvre shrank.

“He was caught in a bind between wanting to show the international community that he was not inflexible, and not wishing to appear weak within his own country,” the journalist Allister Sparks wrote in his book Tomorrow Is Another Country: The Inside Story of South Africa’s Road to Change.

In 1985, Botha was supposed to announce a giant step away from apartheid but his proposals, which offered blacks the vote under a legislative system that gave them no real power, disillusioned South Africa’s few remaining friends in the world.

Botha was re-elected in 1987. Two years later, as opposition to his intransigent style grew within his own party, he suffered a stroke and resigned.

He was succeeded by FW de Klerk, who legalised opposition parties, freed Mandela and other political prisoners, and made the agreements that eventually brought apartheid down.

Pieter Willem Botha was born on January 12 1916 in the Orange Free State.

Raised in the traditions of the Bible and the gun, Botha learned to ride and shoot and to embrace the embattled self-image of the Afrikaner.

“I grew up on a farm where I came to know black people very well,” Botha told Joseph Lelyveld in an interview for his book Move Your Shadow: South Africa, Black and White.

“I played with them, I worked with them. I was taught by my father to be strict with them, but just.”

In 1943 Botha married Anna Elizabeth (Elize) Rossouw, who died in 1977. They had five children. He married Barbara Robertson in 1998.

In the 1948 general election, Botha won a seat in parliament.

His rise through the government ranks coincided with the country’s deepening isolation.

In 1974, the UN took away South Africa’s seat in the General Assembly. Three years later, debate over trade sanctions reached a fever pitch.

But the disciples of apartheid hung tough. As defence minister, Botha increased military spending, conducted a clandestine weapons trade and pushed for the development of nuclear weapons.

In the early 1980s, his government launched military strikes on insurgent groups in neighbouring countries and carried out a programme of assassinating anti-apartheid activists.

In 1985, the government announced an indefinite state of emergency. In 1986, Archbishop Desmond Tutu addressed the UN and urged further sanctions.

Botha grew defiant. But even within the Botha government, pressure was growing for negotiations with the ANC. Clandestine overtures were made to Mandela, who had been in prison since 1963.

In March 1989, Mandela offered to negotiate a political settlement. Botha, who had had a stroke that January, met Mandela on July 5 1989. The encounter turned out to be little more than a courtesy call.

Botha’s days in office were numbered. Increasingly ill-tempered and authoritarian, he remained reluctant to move on with reform.

In February 1989 he renounced his position as NP leader while keeping the presidency. That August, at a cabinet meeting, his successor as party leader, FWdeKlerk, suggested that he step down. That night, in an angry, rambling broadcast, he resigned.

Under De Klerk, apartheid unraveled. In 1990, Mandela was freed and the ANC was unbanned. In April 1994, the first multiracial election was held and Mandela became president.

Apartheid was finished. Its brutality was exposed by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Botha derided the commission as a witch hunt.

After failing to attend a hearing in Cape Town on December 19 1997, he was found guilty of contempt of court, fined and sentenced to a suspended 12-month prison term. The conviction was overturned on appeal.

“I have nothing to apologize for,” he said. ‘’I will never ask for amnesty. Not now, not tomorrow, not after tomorrow.”

A Marxist Poet: The Legacy of Gillo Pontecorvo

By Alexander Billet

This was an essay that appeared on Oct. 19, 2006 in the MR Zine (a zine website set up by the Monthly Review Foundation, publishers of The Monthly Review). Alexander Billet is a writer and activist who lives in Washington D.C. and is currently working on a book titled The Kids Are Shouting Loud: The Music and Politics of The Clash.

The views and opinions expressed in this essay do not necessarily reflect those of the creator of this blog and are the sole responsibility of the author. Essays expressing opinions similar to and counter to those of the creator of this blog are strictly for diversity and to start thoughtful and meaningful discussion.

Pauline Kael, the American film critic, once said that Gillo Pontecorvo was the most dangerous kind of Marxist: a Marxist poet. When the Italian film director died last week at the age of 86, he had not made a full-length feature in over twenty-five years. Yet the potency of Pontecorvo's firebrand poetry can still be felt today. Despite completing only a small handful films during his fifty-year career, his unique voice and uncompromising politics have made a lasting impression that resonates throughout the world of cinema.

It was The Battle of Algiers (La Bataille D'Alger) that established Pontecorvo as one of the most controversial filmmakers of his time and as an international icon. Any director or writer who has ventured into the world of social or political filmmaking, from Mira Nair to Oliver Stone, will cite Algiers as an influence, and its mark can be felt on movies as diverse as Traffic and Do the Right Thing.

Pontecorvo was born in 1919 to middle-class Jewish parents in an Italy soon to be in the hands of Mussolini's fascism. He described himself in his early years as being fairly "apolitical." But with growing anti-semitism in Italy, Pontecorvo's path was to inevitably cross with the growing anti-fascism among ordinary Europeans. During a trip to France, where he rubbed elbows with the likes of Picasso and Jean-Paul Sartre, as well as some who had fought against Franco in the Spanish Civil War, his radicalization crystallized. Upon returning to Italy in the 1940s, he joined the underground anti-fascist movement and became the head of the clandestine Communist youth organization.

With the fall of fascism, Pontecorvo set out to become a photojournalist, but after seeing Roberto Rossellini's masterpiece Paisan, about the fascist persecution of Italian partisans, he decided that his passion lay in filmmaking. His first films were documentaries and short films, and his first full length, La Grande Strada Azzurra (The Wide Blue Road) would garner much praise and a prize at the Karlovy Vary Festival. But it was 1959's Kapo, a film about a woman's escape attempt from a Nazi concentration camp, in which Pontecorvo would begin to take up explicitly political issues. The director had left the Communist Party in 1956 in protest against the Soviet invasion of Hungary, but as his films show, he would always remain dedicated to social change. "I'm still a man of the left," he would say in a 1992 interview, "searching . . . for a way to change the terrible things in our world."

This would become apparent in his next film. The Battle of Algiers, the story of the Algerian people's struggle for liberation from French domination, is regarded as Pontecorvo's masterpiece and cemented his place as the foremost political filmmaker of his generation. It employed revolutionary techniques to deliver an airtight case against French colonialism in the same vein as Frantz Fanon. First, the film was shot in the style of a newsreel: black and white, grainy. Second, instead of following one dominant protagonist, he sought to make the Algerian people as a whole the protagonist, a "choral personage" which would owe much to Rosselini as well as Sergei Eisenstein. Here is where we see Pontecorvo at his best: his masterfully realistic depiction of crowds, and his careful selection of non-actors in the main roles. Pontecorvo was so loyal to realism that he even cast Saadi Yacef, a leader of the Algerian liberation movement, in the role of El-Hadi Jaffar, the rebel leader in the Algiers Casbah. The result is an immediacy unparalleled by most films.

Pontecorvo also wanted to humanize -- rather than dogmatically villainize -- the French occupiers. "I believe, and above all (scriptwriter) Franco Solinas believed, that it is important to get inside the minds of both sides. The paratroopers, for instance; why should we make them out to be monsters, or like the SS? The condemnation of colonialism, which was our objective, is better served by putting the blame elsewhere: on the error and intransigence of colonialism." Hence, the French Colonel Mathieu (played by Jean Martin, the only professional actor in the cast) is charismatic, sophisticated, and makes clear that he is simply here to do a job, the job that becomes more and more chilling as we see him and his troops brutally torture Algerians to gain intelligence on the resistance.

These perfectly created what Pontecorvo called a "dictatorship of truth." By the end of the film, there is little question that the Algerians are justified in kicking out the French, using whatever means necessary to that end. The film garnered both controversy and praise upon its release; despite being banned in France for four years, it won the Golden Lion at the 1966 Venice Film Festival, as well as many other awards and nominations. It was clearly a polarizing movie: Western conservatives attempted to write it off as a piece of Communist propaganda, while radical groups from the IRA to the Black Panthers used it as a source of learning and inspiration.

It is appropriate that Algiers would find a new generation of admirers and enthusiasts. Today, it is frequently screened by left-wing and anti-war groups all over the world in order to better understand the consequences arrogant imperialism. Ironically, the Pentagon, too, held a screening of the film in 2003 to better "prepare" for what lay ahead in Iraq. Looking at the country today, though, we may safely say that they didn't learn the right lesson: namely that occupations ultimately fail.

Pontecorvo made two more full-length features: 1969's Queimada! (Burn!) and 1979's Ogro (Ogre). Both also took up the question of violence against an occupying force. But from Ogro's release until his death last week, the master of political filmmaking was an absence in the world of cinema. A relentless perfectionist, he often scrapped projects on which studios wanted him to compromise. In the end, he would rather the film not get made at all than be watered down by a film company trying to skirt political controversy. A quick glance at some of his scuttled projects reveals what we missed: from a chronicling of the first Palestinian Intifada, to a biography of Salvadoran Archbishop and human rights activist Oscar Romero.

Perhaps the real tragedy of Pontecorvo's untimely death, as well as his relative absence from the big screen in recent decades, is that the nature of the world we live in today would have been best illuminated by his perspective. In a world where the arm of imperialism is constantly attempting to stretch itself to new territories, a lens of clarity like Pontecorvo's is sorely needed in the realm of film. Edward Said made Pontecorvo's contribution very clear: "In the end I think his films leave us with a lot of questions; questions like can empires be defeated? Is there a possibility for relationships between western societies and non-western societies that are not based on oppression and discrimination?" At a time when those very questions are more urgent than ever, few filmmakers force us to confront them, and even fewer can force us so skillfully. Compared to Algiers, most "issue" movies today seem preachy or apologetic. That is why Pontecorvo's films remain so important.

Pontecorvo's works like The Battle of Algiers have withstood the test of time for a reason: they continue to inspire and teach. The flawless way in which his movies mix politics and art serves as a brilliant example for today's directors. Will a new generation of filmmakers take up the torch he has so gracefully passed to them? If they do, that will be Pontecorvo's biggest legacy.

The Oppression of Shudras/Dalits in India, Part V: A Hindu Liberationist Perspective

It’s all one skin and bone,
one piss and shit,
one blood, one meat.
From one drop, a universe.
Who’s Brahmin? Who’s Shudra?
-Kabir (15th century Bhakti saint)

Today there are around 200-250 million Dalits in India with 75-80% of them below the poverty line(1) and backward castes as a whole (Dalits, tribes, etc.) forming close to 52% of the population of India.(2) Needless to say caste oppression in India is probably the greatest injustice still existing in, and haunting, that society today. I come to this subject as an outsider (in every sense of the word, I’m a white Christian American male!) looking in not knowing the full intricacies that effect lower caste and non-caste Indians, nor do I pretend to know or try and talk about subjects that are outside of my realm of knowledge. I’m writing this essay because of a Reuters article that came out in August and that appeared in Al Jazeera which perked my interest in the subject of caste. Although I may be critiquing caste in Indian society I do not mean to degrade the great and ancient religious tradition that is Hinduism nor do I mean to impose my religious beliefs (I follow the school of thought of Liberation Theology in the Christian tradition) onto those who follow the Hindu tradition because I recognize that many Christians have done this in the name of liberating people from the horrors of caste oppression. I’m not so narrow minded and simple to think that Christianity is the answer to caste oppression in India, in fact, I recognize that even in Christian communities and churches priests and worshipers still follow the caste system and still oppress people on the basis of caste, even though they claim to have liberated people from the rigid structures of caste.(3) In order to overcome the evils of caste all Indians have to do is to just look at their own traditions (not to Christianity) in order to see that there are liberating schools of thought within those traditions, and this is indeed what many have done over the centuries, whether it was Swaminarayan (1781-1830) who got rid of caste in his community of followers, Vivekananda (1863-1902) who preached that the downtrodden needed to be uplifted and that the caste distinction needed to be rid of, or the great B. R. Ambedkar (1891-1956), the militant Dalit who ferociously fought against all forms of caste discrimination and latter converted to Buddhism (with 200,000 of his followers) claiming that Hinduism was so corrupt and oppressive that he could no longer consider himself Hindu. All three Indians, and many many more, fought against the caste system and/or caste distinction (all though Swaminarayan and Vivekananda were from the Brahmin caste with only Ambedkar being outside of the caste system, a Dalit), while I won’t take up the line that Ambedkar did (that Hinduism was hopelessly corrupt and evil) I will be critiquing that aspect of Hinduism. Again, as I’ve said above, I am an outsider looking in, a non-Hindu, so because of this my criticisms will not be as harsh as are my criticisms of Christianity because I don’t want to be mistaken as criticizing the Hindu religion as a whole, which is not at all my intention.

The caste system is as old as the Hindu religion itself, in fact, it even predates Hinduism by some centuries. One important thing to know about the caste system is that it was brought into the Indus Valley from the outside by a tribe of semi-nomadic people called the Aryans (the “Noble Ones”), who originally inhabited the steppe country of southern Russia and Central Asia and entered India, through the Indus Valley, around the year 1500 BCE.(4) The Aryans had a linear sense of time and had a structured caste system with three sets of castes (warrior caste on top, followed by a priestly caste, and then everyone else) and a plethora of mostly male gods, the language that the Aryans spoke was Sanskrit which latter became the basis for Hindi. When the Aryans invaded the Indus Valley the people of the Indus Valley had a religion with no caste system, a circular sense of time (hence the Hindu concept of reincarnation, etc.), and a pantheon of female goddesses.(5) The fact that the outsider Aryans introduced India to the caste system and was a warrior-centered culture that had a reverence for male gods is one of the reasons why scholars, such as Kalpana Kannabiran argue that “patriarchy is in fact the basis of the caste system and that the patterns of hierarchy, power and authority which characterise the caste system are derived from earlier forms of gender-based oppression.”(6) When the Aryans first invaded the Indus Valley they called the Indus Valley people (Indians) Dasa (Sanskrit for dark-skinned) and the three-tier caste system was morphed into a four-tier caste system called the Four Varnas (which means color); Brahmins, the priestly class were now on the top, Ksatriyas, the warrior class were now below the priests, then their was the Vaishyas, skilled labor, and the Sudras, unskilled labor. Outside of the caste system were the non-Vedic peoples and the Dalits (the untouchables). Originally the lighter one’s skin color was the higher up in the caste system one was (with the Aryans obviously being at the top of the system) and the higher up in the caste system one was the more “pure” that person was (purity was of a huge concern of the Indus Valley people with many ritual and private baths having been excavated).(7) The majority of the people in the Indus Valley fell within the lower castes which can be seen today since 77% of Indians comprise these lower castes (as well as Dalits, scheduled castes/scheduled tribes [SC/ST], etc.).(8) What this mini-history lesson shows us was that the concept of caste is a concept that was brought into India by outside forces (the patriarchical and warrior culture of the Aryans) which then incorporated itself into the civilization of the Indus Valley people through the Vedas (specifically the Rg Veda). The Aryans and Brahmins needed a system to keep themselves on top and the majority of the dark-skinned Indus Valley people at the bottom, the caste system was the perfect way to do this, and in fact this had been the case until around 500 BCE when the traditions of the Vedas and the Brahmins began to be attacked by Hindu ascetics.(9)

From around 600 BCE to 200 BCE there was an incredible Vedic development in the Hindu tradition (a philosophic development) which can be described as the “democratization of Hinduism.” Out of this philosophic development came the Upanisads (upanisad implies “sitting at the feet of the teacher,” Upa=down, Ni=near, and Sad=sit).(10) The Upanisads were focused on attaining the mystical knowledge that would free a person from “re-death” or punarmrtyu. The Brhadāranyaka Upanisad placed emphasis on the knowledge of the cosmic connection underlying ritual. “When the doctrine of the identity of atman (the Self) and brahman was established in the Upanishads, the true knowledge of the Self and the realization of this identity...substituted the ritual method.”(11) Asceticism started becoming more widespread (which was one the factors leading to the creation of the latter Upanisads) in reaction to the rigid doctrines of the Brahmin and of the Vedas. What’s important to note as that even though these ascetics were critical of the Vedas and scathing in their critiques of the Brahmins they were still very much Hindu in nature (in fact, they probably didn’t consider themselves anything else, all though the term Hindu wasn’t around then) and their philosophical teachings and thought derived from the Vedas. These ascetics denied that only Brahmins could receive bliss and escape reincarnation and stated that through giving up the world and all desires anyone, whether Dalit or Vaishya, could attain psychic security, or rather, liberation through the attainment of unification with Brahman. Out of reaction to this the Brhamins devised a doctrine called the four asramas (abodes) which dived the life of the “twice born” into four stages” which would keep asceticism in check by confining it to middle-aged males.(12)

On top of these ascetics came leaders who led offshoots of Hinduism and breakaway sects such as Siddhartha Gautama (the Buddha) and Vardhamana (Mahavira, the great teacher of Jainism). These two leaders rejected not only the pleasures of the world, but more importantly, they rejected the claims of the Brahmins and the ritualistic Brahminic schools who claimed authority and superiority over other Hindus and Indians by claiming to be pure and to have the right to perform traditional rituals and sacrifices, as well as having the rights to interpret their meanings. While the Buddha rejected Hinduism (as well as religion) all together, Mahavira kept to the central aspects of Hinduism while abandoning the rituals that allowed the Brahmins to dominate all aspects of life. Mahavira stated that through one’s own efforts one could attain liberation and freedom from rebirth,(13) short of the Buddha, this was one of the most complete rejections of the Brahmins (and in turn their belief in ritual purity and caste) that anyone could have ever articulated.

All of this now brings us to today and to the subject of the liberation of Dalits and to the subject of my final blog in this series, a Hindu Liberationist perspective on the plight of Dalits and of their liberation from caste oppression. What disturbed me about the student protests against the further admission of lower caste and SC/ST students was that these high caste students had the wrong premise that the oppression of lower caste and SC/ST peoples was the “correct” form of Hinduism and the only form that should be practiced (all though I do recognize that some of these students could have been playing the “caste card,” claiming caste privilege in order to protect their privilege in society). Yet we have seen in the ancient history of Hinduism that caste was an outside concept placed upon the Indus Valley people by an outside tribe of semi-nomadic pastoralists, this shows us that the concept of caste didn’t grow “organically” from Indian soil but was imposed from the outside, and hence, the shedding of caste ideology and caste oppression would in a sense mean the shedding of outside Aryan domination against the Indian peoples, of course many high caste Indians still adhere to their Aryan roots and view their Brahmin status as a source of pride, not something to overcome in order to help out their lower caste and Dalit sisters and brothers. Despite the seemingly set in stone concepts of caste in the Rg Veda many Hindus over the preceding centuries fought back against the Brahminic elite and questioned the writings of the Vedas, especially the writings on ritualistic purity (a major concept in caste ideology) and on the “privileges” of the Brahmin caste. Whether it was the radical Siddhartha Gautama, who renounced Hinduism, or Vardhamana, who used acetic concepts of Hindu thought to criticize the present day establishment, thoughtful Hindus and the ever evolving Hindu religion never laid down and accepted the perverse policies of the Brahmin and their constant quest for power. Because of this we can see that Hinduism was never a monolithic religion that accepted the Vedas sayings on caste and ritual as blindly as present day Hindu nationalist BJP (Bharatiya Janata Party) and RSS (Rashtriya Svayamsevak Sangh) supporters would like us to think. History has shown us that a thoughtful and pious Hindu can be one who rejects certain ideas of Vedic thought that are oppressive and evil and history has also shown us within the Hindu tradition there has always been an ever evolving struggle for freedom against the Brahminic caste in the realm of the physical and the realm of the spiritual, such as reclaiming concepts of freedom from rebirth and attaining liberation by being joined with Brahmin. With this in mind I will now actually tackle (in part VI, the final part, of this series) the problems of the caste system and the oppressions Dalits have faced over the centuries (especially the 20th century and now) and how Dalits will be the ones to actually bring about change in this present day situation and how Dalits are the only ones to bring about their own salvation (not from outside help from people such as Gandhi or someone like myself) and how the Hindu religion plays a role in this, and how it can play a liberating role instead of the role of oppressor.

Endnotes

1. Grey, Mary, “Dalit Women and the Struggle for Justice in a World of Global Capitalism,” The
Journal of Britain & Ireland School of Feminist Theology 14, no. 1 (Sept. 2005): 129.
2. Ghose, Sagarika, “The Dalit in India,” Social Research 70, no. 1 (Spring 2003): 84.
3. Mary, “Dalit Women,” 144.
4. Encyclopedia Britannica, 2006, “Hinduism,” available at Encyclopedia Britannica Online
http://www.search.eb.com/eb/article-8972 (accessed Oct. 28, 2006).
5. Kyle Dupen, Philosophy 502 World Religions Lecture (San Francisco State University: San
Francisco, CA) 26 Aug. 2005; Encyclopedia Britannica, 2006, “Hinduism,” available at
Encyclopedia Britannica Online http://www.search.eb.com/eb/article-8981 (accessed Oct. 28,
2006).
6. Cited by Gabriele Dietrich, “The Relationship between Women’s Movement and Dalit
Movements: Case Study and Conceptual Analysis,” in A New Thing on Earth: Hopes and Fears
Facing Feminist Theology (Delhi: Indian Society for the Promotion of Christian Knowledge for
Tamil Nadu Theological Seminary, Madurai, 2001): 217.
7. Encyclopedia Britannica, 2006, “Hinduism,” available at Encyclopedia Britannica Online
http://www.search.eb.com/eb/article-8972 (accessed Oct. 28, 2006).
8. The Mustard Seed, “The Oppression of Shudras in India: A Marxist and Hindu Perspective, Part I,” http://www.mustardkernal.blogspot.com (accessed Oct. 28, 2006).
9. Encyclopedia Britannica, 2006, “Hinduism,” available at Encyclopedia Britannica Online
http://www.search.eb.com/eb/article-8984 (accessed Oct. 28, 2006).
10. Dupen, Lecture, 2 Sept. 2005.
11. Encyclopedia Britannica, 2006, “Hinduism,” available at Encyclopedia Britannica Online
http://www.search.eb.com/eb/article-59824 (accessed Oct. 28, 2006).
12. Ibid., http://www.search.eb.com/eb/article-8984 (accessed Oct. 28, 2006).
13. Ibid., http://www.search.eb.com/eb/article-59009 (accessed Oct. 28, 2006).

Reasons for Being MIA

Hello everyone (which isn’t a lot of people at all, but hopefully, someday there will be quite a few people reading this blog!), it’s been a while since my last post, September 9th to be exact. The reasons for this have to do with my schooling at San Francisco State University (SFSU) and the actual mission of this blog site. Instead of being a “normal” blog site in where I post my opinion and views randomly and at regular intervals I instead want this to be a blog site “of well thought out and smart discussions on mainly theological and political issues” and in order to have “well thought out and smart discussions” one needs to research and write good blogs. So instead of having short blogs of 1,000-2,000 words I normally have blogs (essays actually) of 12,000-18,000 words. Because of this it takes me a little longer to write my blogs than usual, the goal of my blog site is one essay every two to three weeks by me filled in with contributions by other bloggers (thank you Rorik Strindberg!) and articles, essays, and blogs from other websites. To top it off I’ve had a very busy school semester, I’m working on a thesis paper on Marx’s theory of fetishism and “prosperity theology” as well as Michel Novak’s Catholic views of capitalism for my religious studies minor, I’m also working on the school newspaper the Golden Gate [X]Press and its website (I’m photographing an article on the Hindu and Indian population at SFSU and college freshmen and Halloween, plus many others). But as you read this I’m finishing up on my blog series “The Oppression of Shudras/Dalits in India” and the final two posts should be up within the next few days. Part III of my blog series “Mesopotamia Burning” will be up around mid-November when I get a week off of school for Thanksgiving. Again, I apologize for not having a recent blog up in a while (hope you’ve enjoyed the articles I’ve posted on this site as well as the blogs by Rorik Strindberg, so far my only contributor) but that will change quickly, but it should be shady like this until the end of my semester which will be around the late midpoint of December.

Episcopalian Crisis: Authority, Homosexuality & the Future of Anglicanism, Part II

By Jay Seltser

The views and opinions expressed in this essay do not necessarily reflect those of the creator of this blog and are the sole responsibility of the author. Essays expressing opinions similar to and counter to those of the creator of this blog are strictly for diversity and to start thoughtful and meaningful discussion.

This the second part of a slightly edited essay that appeared in the May 19, 2006 issue of Commonweal, an independent Catholic journal of opinion edited and managed by lay Catholics.

I know many Catholics ask the same questions about their church’s teachings on contraception and other disputed issues. Autobiography is crucial here. My own views are shaped in part by the Jewish tradition I lived in for most of my life, before I became a Christian sixteen years ago. As I experienced and loved it, Judaism is a tradition steeped in a text but also committed at its core to interpretation and adaptation. The structure of the key Jewish sources through which the Bible is read is inherently dialogical; rabbinic figures debate with one another over the meaning of particular biblical verses, citing alternative verses or different meanings of the same words, different analogies, or diverse human experiences. The goal is seldom theoretical understanding for its own sake, but rather practical understanding to allow the community to remain faithful to a long-standing covenant while living in very different historical circumstances. The Jewish tradition has its own liberal/conservative continuum, but the center of the tradition is one of a continually changing and creative interaction of a community with its authorizing texts. This set of experiences and my personal commitment to open intellectual discussion and debate leave me very uncomfortable with the idea that specific biblical passages are always the determining or sole source of divine guidance or inspiration.

My own journey into Christianity was not motivated by rejection of Judaism but rather by a growing appreciation-aesthetic as well as intellectual, emotional as well as doctrinal-of the Christian story, Christian symbols, and Christian worship. Much to my surprise, I found the central story of Jesus’ incarnation, passion, death, and resurrection to reflect much of what I believed about who God is and how he acts. I found the cross to be a symbol of both redemptive suffering and the interaction between human sinfulness and divine compassion. And in the language of Christian worship, I discovered a voice and an idiom that seemed to express my deepest longings for prayer.

I began to attend Episcopal services while I was engaged to a woman studying to become a priest. It was the language and liturgy of the Book of Common Prayer, with its soaring Elizabethan prose and its broad incorporation of both Catholic and Protestant sensibilities, that led me to the baptismal font and to confirmation in the Episcopal Church. This is not unusual, because Episcopalians are frequently more likely to define themselves in terms of the Book of Common Prayer than in terms of adherence to particular doctrinal statements.

In addition to the liturgical and symbolic power of Episcopal worship, I was drawn to the intellectual power of the tradition, as reflected particularly in the writings and continuing influence of the sixteenth-century figure Richard Hooker. His massive work, Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity, is a brilliant effort to define how the Church of England can protect itself from what he saw as the twin threats of Roman Catholic authoritarianism and domination on one hand, and Puritan narrow-mindedness and self-righteousness on the other. A few observations about Hooker’s approach will underscore what is both attractive yet admittedly problematic about the church that continues to be so indebted to his vision.

Hooker looked for positions and principles that could unite diverse individuals, and he tried to distinguish the essential elements that are worth fighting over from the nonessentials that are not. He was uncomfortable assuming bad motives by his opponents, in part because he recognized the gray areas of human life. He wrote that “Our end ought always to be the same, our ways and means thereunto not so.” Hooker saw in the Church of England a sign of “a course more calm and moderate,” providing a model for the other churches that were immersed in “mutual combustions bloodsheds and wastes.”

The substance of his position is reflected in the way he argued his case. The structure of the Laws proceeds by presenting long quotations from key Puritan writers, acknowledging what was reasonable in their position, and then stating the areas of disagreement and trying to indicate why the Puritan view was wrong. He tried to find a position both sides could agree on. And Hooker was not so sure of the truth of his own position that he demonized his opponents, nor did he draw the lines so firmly that those on the other side were viewed as outside the realm of redemption or the true church. Hooker went so far as to believe that Roman Catholics could go to heaven, a highly unpopular position a few decades after the reign of the Protestant-persecuting Queen Mary and around the time of the Spanish Armada.

It is partly from Hooker that Anglicans (including Episcopalians) inherit their long-standing view that Christian authority derives from the interaction of Scripture, the tradition of the church, and human reason and experience. Hooker began with the authority of Scripture, and believed that it was normative when it provided clear guidance. But the Christian tradition’s centuries of reflection on Scripture, and the reasoned consensus and consideration of the contemporary community, are essential once we recognize that the Bible does not provide an unambiguous set of answers to contemporary questions. This tripartite approach is necessary and complex, both because none of these sources is univocal or self-disclosing without extensive interpretation, and because the sources can and do conflict when applied to complex problems. (Even the seemingly unambiguous condemnations of homosexual behavior need to account for the very different meaning of the key terms in much earlier and different cultural contexts, and the difficulties of imagining how the writers may have responded to a different set of potential relationships offered in a different historical situation.)

I was drawn to this broad and somewhat ambiguous view of authority, partly because it reminded me of the exciting and playful element of interpretation that I had so loved in the Jewish tradition, but also because of a temperamental and moral distrust of certainty. My own religious experiences were not unequivocal or overpowering revelations of a Christian God who crowded out or eliminated all other options; my journey into the Christian community was not a story of sudden enlightenment or joyous salvation but rather a long process of exploration, doubt, and subtle but revealing suggestions of a God who had done amazing things and who seemed able to be revealed through mundane and mixed human lives. It was this vision, with all its ambiguity and halting movements, that was embodied in an Anglican tradition and an Episcopal Church that struggled explicitly with the tension between faith and reason, certainty and doubt, unity and diversity.

The center of the Anglican tradition has insisted on bringing together a Catholic and Protestant approach to Christian worship, order, and theology. The church is “Catholic” in many respects. Sacraments are central, parish leaders are “priests,” bishops lead dioceses, and Episcopalians try to take seriously the tradition of apostolic succession and the connection of the U.S. church with fellow Anglican churches throughout the world. In these ways, Episcopalians are somewhat more content than many other Protestants to affirm belief in a church that is “one, holy, catholic, and apostolic.”

Yet at the same time, Episcopalians are self-consciously “catholic with a small c,” reflecting the historical refusal to accept the form of organization and authority centered on the bishop of Rome. It is no small matter that the name given to the new church in the United States in 1789 was the “Protestant Episcopal Church.” The form of organization developed along with the formation of the U.S. government, and the church structure reflects the concern for balance of powers, lay influence, and distrust of centralized authority that also define the U.S. Constitution.

As the current crisis exemplifies, the temperamental taste for finding middle ground, for avoiding extremes, and for striving for unity in the midst of diversity, is both the strength and weakness of the Episcopal Church, and the Anglican Communion as a whole. For those seeking a church with room for a wide variety of views, the Episcopal Church can offer a welcoming embrace, a settling calm in the midst of doctrinal storms, a place to learn and talk about how to make sense of our varied perspectives. As long as members of the community maintain Hooker’s distinction between the essential and the nonessential, and view most of the disagreements as being open to serious discussion, a tolerance for different views can be fostered.

But for those seeking a clearer vision of theological truth, the Episcopal Church can be a frustrating place indeed. The drawbacks are obvious in times of significant disagreement, as each portion of the community seems to have the right to draw the line wherever it chooses. Specific disputes cannot be resolved easily by appeal to a central authority; the degree of autonomy of each parish and diocese, and the pluralistic and democratic nature of national decision making, can exacerbate tensions and create the basis for continuing conflicts. Of course, similar tensions exist within Roman Catholicism, as the current upheavals in Boston and elsewhere show. Still, at least to an outsider, Catholic disagreements tend to be either resolved or submerged more effectively, because of the Catholic Church’s embrace of a more unequivocal central authority, one that can set clearer boundaries and even restrict discussion. (Or at least discipline theologians and remove editors!)

One of the most attractive and intriguing aspects of the Episcopal Church is its faith that a democratic religious community that locates control in the individual or the parish can still remain faithful to an ancient tradition of creedal orthodoxy and discipleship. It is not surprising that such a community is likely to be more contentious, disordered, and ambiguous than one with clearer lines of authority or arbiters of orthodoxy. Whether democracy and creedal orthodoxy are compatible is now being sorely tested, and there is much at stake for other religious communities in the outcome.

In a wonderful essay on Hooker, Rowan Williams emphasizes that worship involves God’s ability to transform us in our frailty. Hooker was, in Williams’s words, a “contemplative pragmatist,” struggling to find a way through complex disagreements and insisting on the creation of a community that provides sufficient room for diverse views on all but the most essential matters of faith. Williams suggests that Hooker’s vision of Christian community is of a community that is “dialogical rather than a simple process of instruction.” I imagine that is a vision of the church that many Catholics share.

Archbishop Williams himself is the preeminent Anglican theologian in the world, a brilliant scholar and writer who combines breathtaking intellectual energy and productivity with a deeply spiritual and reflective approach to the nature of the church and Christian life. Although he has staked out liberal positions on many issues, he is also seen as being deeply committed to preserving and handing on the orthodox tradition. It remains unclear whether his sensitivity and intellect will allow him to resolve the conflicts within his church, or whether his role as its most important institutional figure will constrain his ability to develop a creative position that would be viewed as institutionally and theologically acceptable to both sides. His current calls for a moratorium and for more faithful reflection are appropriate but may be insufficient to bridge the chasm between members of opposing parties who are convinced they are hearing and following God’s word.

I remain within the Episcopal Church in part because I want to be a member of a community that allows for diverse views and alternative interpretations, views that force me, along with others in my community, to struggle with what we think God is doing. I would rather be part of a church whose conservatives force me to be informed and guided by Scripture, even when I am inclined to dismiss what seem like anachronistic and even unjust teachings. And I would rather be part of a church whose liberals force me to listen to new voices and perspectives, even when I am inclined to dismiss them as modernist, unorthodox, or faddish.

To my mind, the question of whether an openly and sexually actively gay person can serve as a bishop is not a matter of essential Christian faith, nor is the identity or faithfulness of Episcopalians threatened by such service. I respect those who feel differently, but I think they are confusing the essential with the inessential. I believe the identity and faithfulness of the church are threatened far more by those who think the Gnostic Gospels or The Da Vinci Code has more to teach us than the Nicene Creed or the central texts of the Bible. I wish the ECUSA had waited a bit longer to take the step to ordain a sexually active homosexual person as bishop, and I wish the opponents of that step were more willing to consider whether God may be doing something new in our own time. But I continue to be an Episcopalian because the arguments, the disagreements, and even the threats of schism are all part of a messy and all-too-human way of struggling together to glimpse the nature and actions of an ultimately unknowable and infinitely loving God.

Constitution at the heart of Thai Coup

By Erik Martinez Kuhonta

The views and opinions expressed in this essay do not necessarily reflect those of the creator of this blog and are the sole responsibility of the author. Essays expressing opinions similar to and counter to those of the creator of this blog are strictly for diversity and to start thoughtful and meaningful discussion.

This article appeared today in the Speaking Freely section in Asia Times Online in where guest writers can contribute to the online publication. Erik Martinez Kuhonta is an assistant professor of political science at McGill University. He is a specialist on Thai politics and has been published in several journals.

Thailand's September 19 military coup d'etat that overthrew prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra had its origins in the 1997 constitution, which was meant to strengthen the country's democratic institutions. The constitution, heralded as the most democratic in the country's history, ironically helped Thaksin rule in an autocratic manner.

It in effect allowed him to tighten his control over his coalition and the parliamentary opposition, thereby solidifying his monopoly on power. Despite numerous efforts to weaken the government through parliamentary procedures, the opposition was impotent. As a result, civil society took to the streets to challenge Thaksin. But this move also failed to provide any concrete change. Many continued to point to the need for constitutional reform as the only way of dislodging Thaksin.

Indeed, one of the first steps of the coup group was to dissolve the progressive 1997 constitution upon seizing power on the night of September 19. The aim of the previous charter was to create a solid check-and-balance system underpinned by strong institutions that would in effect end two pathologies in the Thai political system: the history of bureaucratic-authoritarian dominance and the cycle of corrupt, provincial politicians exploiting the state for personal interests.

Although the immediate catalyst for the new constitution was the 1991 military coup and the subsequent 1992 bloody crackdown on pro-democracy demonstrators, the real focus of reform, particularly in terms of institution-building and checks and balances, was aimed at the provincial politicians, whom many had blamed for creating the conditions for a military coup in the first place.

The 1997 constitution created numerous rules and institutions that were intended to give the government greater stability and staying power. Some of the most critical included the separation between the executive and the legislature. For instance, the constitution prohibited a cabinet member from remaining a member of parliament (MP) to reduce his chance of using his cabinet seat for funneling patronage to his faction. This made cabinet members more beholden to the prime minister than to his or her faction. A cabinet member dissenting against the prime minister could be dismissed from the political scene without a parliamentary seat to rely on for backing.

Another critical rule meant to buttress the executive over the legislature was the 90-day rule. This rule required a candidate for the Lower House to be a member of a political party for at least 90 days prior to the next election. A perennial problem of governments in Thailand had been the constant party-hopping prior to a new election, as factions searched for more lucrative political opportunities. Now any faction that sought to jump ship ran the risk of being disqualified if the prime minister called a snap election soon after it abandoned the coalition. The 90-day rule thus provided the prime minister with a disciplining tool that severely constrained MPs in their actions. It ensured that the governing coalition would remain intact, shielding it from poaching by other parties.

Other rules instituted to protect the smooth functioning of the executive included the rule for no-confidence debates. Two hundred members - two-fifths of the House - were now necessary to launch a censure motion against the prime minister, while one-fifth of the House would be required to censure a cabinet minister. Furthermore, no-confidence motions by the opposition were limited to one per year. In the past, no-confidence debates were launched simply to embarrass the government without a solid justification.

The net result of these changes in the constitution has been to strengthen the hand of the executive against the legislature. In effect, Thaksin had been able to rule without much dissent within his grand coalition or without much of a challenge from the parliamentary opposition. While in the past rebellious factions had led to the collapse of parliament, this time the governing coalition held on despite a crisis that polarized much of the country. The parliamentary opposition led by the Democrat Party had also been unable to shift the balance of power because it lacked the votes to launch censure motions against the prime minister. With only 97 seats in Thaksin's second term, the Democrat Party was incapable of launching censure motions even against cabinet members.

Street democracy
As a consequence, the only avenue left for challenging the government was the street. Led by Sondhi Limthongkul, a media mogul whose television show was pulled off the air after he began criticizing Thaksin, civil-society groups staged numerous rallies throughout Bangkok. Several of these rallies numbered more than 100,000. Yet despite mass mobilization, Thaksin remained firmly in charge.

Thaksin's gamble to hold an election this April 2 to re-establish his legitimacy backfired when the opposition parties led by the Democrats decided to boycott the election. Although Thaksin's Thai Rak Thai party won the election, some 12 million people used a ballot provision to vote for none of the candidates or else spoiled their ballots. As Thailand became more polarized, His Majesty King Bhumibol Adulyadej stepped in on April 26 and called on the courts to rectify the situation. A week later, the Constitutional Court voided the April election. With a new election scheduled for October, where Thaksin looked likely to win once again and thereby reignite the middle-class rallies on Bangkok's streets, it is not surprising that the military decided to take action.
Most telling, in the early hours of the coup was a statement by the generals calling for the immediate annulment of the constitution as well as the dissolution of the Constitutional Court and its replacement with a Constitutional Tribunal made up entirely of justices. The coup group, now renamed the Council on National Security, subsequently promulgated an interim constitution with the advice of former conservative senator Meechai Ruchuphan, who had likewise drawn up the charter for the 1991 coup. Meechai was assisted in drafting the interim constitution by two former members of Thaksin's administration: Bowornsak Uwanno and Wissanu Krea-ngam. Significantly, perhaps, Bowornsak had been one of the architects of the 1997 constitution.

The interim constitution ensures that the military will continue to dominate the civilian government. It grants the Council on National Security the authority to appoint the chairman and vice chairman of the National Legislative Assembly (which replaces parliament) and the right to dismiss the prime minister. More critically, the interim constitution gives the generals the power to select the members of the Constitution Drafting Assembly (CDA) - the body that will draft the permanent constitution.

The process for the drafting of the new constitution will be an elaborate affair that will take about nine months to complete. First, the ruling council will appoint 2,000 members to a National Assembly. Most of these individuals will come from the ranks of the bureaucracy and academia. From there, the National Assembly will nominate 200 of its own members to the CDA.

The council will then pick 100 of these members to form the CDA. Thirty-five members will then be chosen to form the Constitution Drafting Committee - the main body that will write the new constitution. Ten members of the committee will be hand-picked by the Council on National Security and can come from inside or outside the CDA.

The interim constitution under the Council on National Security is a completely top-down affair. All the members of the CDA are appointed by the council and little room is given for public consultation. The only gesture toward some democratic input is the decision to expose the new constitution to the public for 30 days and then put it to a national referendum. But if the new permanent charter is not approved by the public, the council reserves the right to revise a previous constitution and then enforce it as Thailand's permanent constitution.

Despite all the failures of the 1997 constitution, one of its greatest achievements was its effort to consult with the public. The drafters of the 1997 "People's Constitution" hosted numerous public seminars and ran surveys to get the input of civil society. The interim constitution indicates no similar effort to involve the public. Given the authoritarian manner in which the new constitution will be drafted, it is by no means clear whether constitutional reform will lead to a more robust democracy.

If the new constitution does indeed usher in greater accountability and stronger checks and balances, then Thais will most likely agree that the ends justify the means. But if the new constitution does not strengthen democratic institutions, the middle class will be hard to convince that a military coup is preferable to an elected autocrat.

Episcopalian Crisis: Authority, Homosexuality & the Future of Anglicanism, Part I

By Jay Seltser

The views and opinions expressed in this essay do not necessarily reflect those of the creator of this blog and are the sole responsibility of the author. Essays expressing opinions similar to and counter to those of the creator of this blog are strictly for diversity and to start thoughtful and meaningful discussion.

This the first part of a slightly edited essay that appeared in the May 19, 2006 issue of Commonweal, an independent Catholic journal of opinion edited and managed by lay Catholics.

Many Roman Catholics, ordained and lay, were understandably concerned when the Vatican issued its statement last fall barring men with “deep-seated homosexual tendencies” from the priesthood. If a priest is faithful to his promise of chaste celibacy, what difference does it make if he understands himself to be homosexual? Many people thought it was celibacy, not sexual orientation, that mattered when it came to priestly discipline.

I share the feeling of many people in thinking it is unjust to bar celibate homosexuals from the priesthood. But Rome may have had multiple reasons for issuing such a divisive instruction. Among those possible reasons is the way in which the debate over homosexuality, and especially over the influence, status, and authority of homosexual priests and ministers, has roiled nearly every Protestant denomination. Most conspicuous among those churches where attitudes toward homosexuality pose a serious threat to ecclesial unity is the Anglican Communion.

At its 2003 General Convention, the Episcopal Church of the United States of America (ECUSA) voted to approve the consecration of Gene Robinson, an active homosexual living in a committed relationship, as bishop of New Hampshire. At the same time, the Anglican Church of Canada authorized the blessing of same-sex unions. A firestorm erupted, both in North America and worldwide across the Anglican Communion of thirty-eight loosely allied national and regional churches. Conservative and evangelical Episcopalians, especially Anglican primates in Africa, Asia, and South America, made their outrage and objections known in no uncertain terms. Many threatened to leave the Anglican Communion if Robinson’s ordination stood, or to try to exclude the American Episcopal Church from the Communion.

The archbishop of Canterbury, Rowan Williams, who is the symbolic head of the Anglican Communion, sought to forestall outright schism. Williams, believed to be personally sympathetic to the ordination of homosexuals, urged caution on the ECUSA. He commissioned “The Windsor Report,” released in 2004, which urged the ECUSA to apologize for its actions and to embrace a moratorium on ordaining openly gay bishops and blessing same-sex unions. As Williams recently told the interviewer David Frost, changing church teaching and practice about homosexuality is not a step any one church in the Anglican Communion should undertake on its own. “For a change on that,” Williams said, “I think we would need, as a Communion, to have a far greater level of consensus than we in fact have. Which is why the American determination to go it alone is worrying.”

The forging of any broader consensus on the question of homosexuality seems unlikely. Liberal and conservative groups are already maneuvering to contest the disposition of church property if conservative Episcopal churches, and even dioceses, consequently leave the ECUSA and affiliate themselves with dioceses in Africa and elsewhere, as some already have. Few observers think the predominantly liberal ECUSA will back away from the ordination of more open or sexually active gay bishops, which many Episcopalians see as the logical extension of a struggle for equal rights that first led to the still contested ordination of women as priests and bishops. The Anglican Church in England, for example, although it ordains women as priests, has not yet, out of a concern for ecclesial unity, ordained a woman as bishop.

Looking at the impending implosion of the Anglican Communion, Rome, from its perspective, is perhaps more forward thinking than its critics suspect in trying to forestall any similar battle in the Catholic Church. Catholics who hope their church will change its teaching about homosexuality, the ordination of women, priestly celibacy and marriage, and contraception, while adopting a more collegial approach to the exercise of authority and greater respect for individual conscience, should be chastened by the current crisis in the Episcopal Church. As an Episcopalian who supports and is thankful for his church’s progressive stances on all these issues, I am nevertheless concerned about the health and integrity of my church.

Situating the ECUSA in the larger Anglican Communion is tricky. Without denying the sense of commonality with the rest of the Anglican churches, I suspect that most American Episcopalians could imagine themselves as a completely separate church, cut off from communion with the other Anglican churches, much more easily than Roman Catholics could think of themselves as a separate national church. As a result, the ECUSA is much freer to adopt changes and move in different directions even if it risks being out of step-and even out of communion-with more traditional members of its international fellowship. For Episcopalians, it may be easier to hold divergent views because there is seldom one official position or central authority to enforce the “orthodox” position. The Episcopal Church is democratic and pluralistic in its rules and decision making, and the authority vested in any individual or role is severely limited. General Conventions are held every three years, with clergy and lay participants being elected to the House of Deputies, and bishops meeting as the House of Bishops. The Episcopal Church mirrors the American political system in many respects; local dioceses, functioning with significant autonomy, elect their own bishops in a local convention representing lay and ordained members, and the decision must then be ratified by a national vote.

Episcopalian bishops have a form of authority that is much closer to what sociologists would call “influence” than “power.” The local parish selects its priest, with the bishop’s approval; bishops can help shape priorities but are usually unsuccessful if they move too far ahead of their parishes. Each diocese selects its own bishop, subject to the approval of a national convention. There is a presiding bishop of the U.S. church, and the archbishop of Canterbury is the most preeminent figure in the international Anglican Communion, but any suggestion that either of these figures approaches the pope in terms of power or even influence would be met with hilarious laughter.

For several reasons, the current situation with regard to gay bishops who are sexually active is a “perfect storm.” First, while liberal and conservative positions have long coexisted within the Episcopal Church and the Anglican Communion, the ordination of Bishop Robinson leaves less room for compromise than many earlier disputes. Bishops baptize, confirm, ordain other priests, and lay on their hands at the consecration of other bishops. Although their power is greatly attenuated by a church polity that mirrors, and in fact owes much of its design to, the American distrust of centralized authority, bishops are the key representatives of the local church. Still, an “illegitimate” bishop affects not only one diocese but the integrity of the entire religious community.

Second, the issue of homosexuality seems to present a stark contrast between different approaches to authority, and particularly to the role of the Bible in decision making. Although different approaches to Scripture can be finessed or compromised on many issues (such as the role of women in the church or the appropriate understanding of the Eucharist), conflict over the appropriateness of homosexual relationships is hard to avoid. A significant number of Episcopalians read Scripture quite literally, and insist that there is no appeal where Scripture speaks plainly and with one voice. Several biblical passages that appear to condemn homosexual behavior (at least for males) are regarded as determinative, especially when there are no corresponding passages that support homosexuality. To claim that the Bible allows homosexual behavior, or to ignore apparently clear statements of biblical morality, threatens the center of the community’s loyalty and adherence to the Word of God through the revelatory text.

On the other side, many Episcopalians insist that the specific words of Scripture must be placed in the context of broader historical or literary interpretation, current understandings of the nature of homosexuality, or the witness of Christians living in faithful relationships with a member of the same sex. Liberals argue either that Scripture, properly interpreted, allows room for a variety of sexual practices or norms, or that even if Scripture speaks unequivocally about sexual ethics, its guidance is not necessarily the final word for the church today. The more significant theological split is occasioned by the latter approach, which challenges not only a particular understanding of scriptural texts but the very authority of Scripture itself. The gap between the more conservative and more liberal perspectives is enormous, with little apparent middle ground.

Third, as in the Roman Catholic Church, the Episcopal Church is increasingly polarized along ideological lines. Theological or social disputes are seen in the context of the ongoing “culture wars” that seem to pit religious Americans against “secularists.” The political battles of the past decade and the media obsession with finding and reinforcing opposing views make compromise even harder. It is not surprising that people who read the newspapers and watch television talking heads who take extreme views on the issues of the day will be likely to carry such attitudes about conflict into their activities in their parishes and dioceses.

Finally, I think that while it is seldom acknowledged, the conflict over homosexuality frequently reveals a deep visceral distaste, even disgust, for the behaviors under consideration. Many other biblical prohibitions-against divorce, women speaking in church, eating certain foods-have been altered. People may oppose the practice of ordaining women or consecrating them as bishops, but few appear to be physically disgusted by the prospect. The apparently unequivocal nature of the condemnations of homosexuality found in the Bible is reinforced by the deeper “instinctive” conviction that homosexual behavior simply cannot be what God intends for his creation. And for those on the liberal side (where I am), there is often a similar, almost visceral, reaction that sees opponents as simply intolerant and homophobic.

Some of the debate in the Episcopal Church also focuses on process, on what Rowan Williams called the ECUSA’s “determination to go it alone.” Conservatives point to earlier pronouncements by the Anglican Communion saying the church was not ready to move ahead on this issue, and accuse the Americans of riding roughshod over both the precedents of the community and the feelings of other churches. Liberals insist that they have followed the established procedure for selecting and consecrating a bishop by receiving the required number of votes at both diocesan and national meetings, and that local dioceses and national churches have the right to take such steps.

Both sides may be narrowly correct but both are broadly misleading in their complaints about due process. It is hard to believe that opponents of Bishop Robinson’s consecration would have been less opposed if the church had delayed and tried to convince others of the rightness of this step. One noted conservative voice makes this clear when he writes that this is a “subject on which Bible Christians are not able to change their minds. Not because we are dinosaurs-but because we believe God has already spoken” (Paul Zahl, Understanding the Windsor Report). And on the other side, organizational autonomy and responsibility within a religious communion must mean more than simply justifying one’s actions on the basis of what the official policies allow one to do.

Given these disagreements, how can Episcopalians resolve their differences? Do we remain within an institution that appears to be falling apart, and one that each side experiences as betraying our own commitment to theological orthodoxy or fairness? As a heterosexual who does not view homosexuality as intrinsically sinful or abnormal, can I continue to value the orthodox tradition that is part of my religious identity within a polity that seems so confused about what the “Christian” church should do?

What Do the Failed Terror Plots in Germany Mean?

By Rorik Strindberg

The views and opinions expressed in this essay do not necessarily reflect those of the creator of this blog and are the sole responsibility of the author. Essays expressing opinions similar to and counter to those of the creator of this blog are strictly for diversity and to start thoughtful and meaningful discussion.

The recent foiled terrorist plot in Germany has redefined the targets for Jihadists. Previously many Germans felt safe, because former Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder's opposition to the Second Iraq War.(1) Statements from Bin Laden like “Why did we not attack Sweden?” made many think that Jihadists opposition to America was only based on disapproval of American Foreign Policy. The Germans and other European nations could tell themselves that if they did not bother the Muslim states, their would be no terrorism. One must remember that the only European Nations that experienced Post-September 11th terrorism attacks were Spain and England, both of whom participates in the Second Iraq War.

This thought is somewhat foolish, considering that the United States was not in Iraq or Afghanistan during September 11th.(2) Also, prior to September 11th the Middle East had not become any more of an important region in US foreign policy thinking since the Carter Doctrine, and less important since Presidents Carter and Reagan supported the Anti-Communist forces in Afghanistan, Northern Alliance and Mujahadine.(3) Sometimes one dose not have the option of supporting ideological allies.(4)

What are the reasons for the thwarted terrorist attacks in Germany? This is a question that one must ask. They don’t fit any of the “Legitimate” reasons for terrorist attacks on a Nation. Germans did not participate in the Second Iraq War. Germans were not in the Middle East, supposedly propping up illegitimate regimes. They did republish the Danish Cartoons that showed the profit Mohamed with a bomb on his head. Clearly an insensitive act, but how dose this justify killing individuals that had nothing to do with the publication? And why not attack Denmark, the Nation where the Cartoons were first published? Attacking Denmark would send a very clear message that more insensitive cartoons would cause terrorism.

One Good answer would be that the Jihadists are fractured. The implementation of policies like the monitoring of known terrorist cell phones and robbing Jihadists of a save haven like Afghanistan, must make communication between Jihadists almost impossible and very slow. A “Foreign Policy” cannot be conducted by one man, like Bin Laden. This has caused splinter groups that tend to be more extreme, like Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who through their brutal tactics have hurt their cause. Note, Bin Laden’s messages to Zarqawi to stop be-headings, because they hurt the cause. Also the Bombings in Jordan that killed one couple that was going to get married could not have helped. Is the German case an other splinter cell, the answer is almost definitely. Either the terrorists were disgruntled Muslim-Germans or Muslims not under the authority of Bin Laden. Either way the Jihadists were opposed to Western values/society and that is the motivation for their belligerence.

Having splinter cells will not allow the Jihadists to conduct a forgien policy. Having Al-Qaeda direct all of the attacks could send a simple message to the world. Don’t cooperate with America, and we won’t bother you. This would cause a greater rift in the Trans-Atlantic Alliance, and make European publics to have greater support for opposing American Policy. Now, Europeans are more likely to see this as a War from Jiahdists on Western values. It is hard to imagine even the people who most adamantly support passiveism, to curtail their own hard fought freedoms to appease Jihadists.

Notes

1. This is true but the Germans participated in the Second Iraq War in a very behind the since manner. Including using German Navy vessels to patrol the sea lanes that the Americans were prier to the War, and dispatching HASMAT teams to Kuwait.

2. It is hard to argue that the post-bellum containment of the Secular and Belligerent Iraq would offend Jihadist, because Saddam represented the type of governments that Jihadists desired to over through.

3. The First Gulf War conflict or Desert Shield/Desert Storm is an action committed in the spirit of the Carter Doctrine.

4. This policy was necessary to prove to the USSR that an other war would bankrupt the nation that consistently spent around 15% of its GDP on their military, to put this in to perspective the United States today spends about 4% of its GDP on the military. And to end the madness of MAD or mutual assured destruction.

The Oppression of Shudras in India, Part IV: Sections 7-8 of "Problem of Dalits"

By the Communist Party of India (Marxist)

The views and opinions expressed in this essay do not necessarily reflect those of the creator of this blog and are the sole responsibility of the author. Essays expressing opinions similar to and counter to those of the creator of this blog are strictly for diversity and to start thoughtful and meaningful discussion.

This essay is taken from sections seven through eight of Resolution Adopted at the All India Convention on Problems of Dalits by the Communist Party of India (Marxist) in New Delhi, India on Feb. 22, 2006.

7. IMMEDIATE TASKS

Taking into account the severity of the caste problem, Com. E. M. Namboodiripad wrote in 1979, “One has to realize that the building of India on modern democratic and secular lines requires an uncompromising struggle against the caste-based Hindu society and its culture. There is no question of secular democracy, not to speak of socialism, unless the very citadel of India’s ‘age-old’ civilization and culture, the division of society into a hierarchy of castes – is broken. In other words, the struggle for radical democracy and socialism cannot be separated from the struggle against caste society.”

On the basis of above understanding the convention calls upon all the units of the Party to take up the social issues as an important task of the Party. Party units should study the position of social oppression in their area and work out the concrete demands to organise campaign and struggles. The mass organisations should take up the specific problems of dalits and organise special campaigns and struggles to achieve their demands.

8. CHARTER OF DEMANDS

This convention sets out the following charter of demands to ensure a better life for the crores of dalits in our country and it calls upon them to join the common movement of all toiling, oppressed and exploited sections of our country to win these demands and also to effect a radical social, economic and political transformation of our country.

1. LAND REFORMS: The central and state governments mus immediately set in motion a process of land reforms whereby land will be redistributed to the landless agricultural labourers and poor peasants gratis. All loopholes in the present laws must be plugged. All schemes to reverse land reform legislation and give away land to multinational corporations and big business houses should be scrapped forthwith.

2. RESERVATIONS: All the backlogs in reserved seats and posts and in promotions for SCs, STs and OBCs must be filled forthwith with special recruitment drives. The three Constitutional amendments made to correct the three OMs issued in 1997 diluting reservations for SCs and STs should be implemented. The pre-1997 vacancies based roster should be restored. A comprehensive legislation covering all aspects of reservation for SCs/STs in employment and education both public and private institutions should be enacted.

3. SPECIAL COMPONENT PLAN: Special Component Plan should be properly implemented in all the states with proper allotment of funds according to the population of dalits. A National Commission should be set up to assess the real position of dalits including reservation. The state level commissions should be set up to oversee the implementation of all schemes connected with the SCs including reservation.

4. INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT: Infrastructure development in the scheduled caste areas like road, water, health, culture and other needs has to be given proper importance. When allotting fund for infrastructure development, a separate allotment for scheduled caste areas should be provided.

A comprehensive National Programme of Minor Irrigation for all irrigable but unirrigated lands of SCs and STs through wells, community wells, bore-wells, community bore-wells and tubewells, bandheras, check-dams, lift, etc., should be immediately undertaken and implemented.

5. ROOTING OUT UNTOUCHABILITY: All forms of untouchability must be rooted out of the country by strengthening the relevant laws, ensuring their strict implementation and most importantly, by launching a mass movement of the people.

6. PROTECTION FROM ATROCITIES: The Central Government should amend and strengthen the SC and ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act 1989, providing for special courts with judges, investigating officers and public prosecutors unburdened by any other work. Social and economic boycott and blackmail should be included as substantive crimes. Full economic rehabilitation of victims and their survivors must be ensured.

7. EMPLOYMENT: The privatisation drive should be stopped as it leads to loot of national assets, greater unemployment, a curtailment of reservations and also a spurt in corruption. The Central Government should enact a bill to provide reservations in the private sector, which has been a long-standing demand of SCs and STs. Special schemes to provide self-employment to SC youth should be started. The Right to Work should be incorporated as a fundamental right in the Constitution.

8. EDUCATION: The commercialisation of education should be stopped since the massive fee and donation structure of private educational managements is something that socially and economically backward students cannot afford. For this, the central government must increase its own outlay on education to 6 % of the GDP. SC/ST students should be given special scholarships to pursue their studies. The stipends in Social Welfare hostels should be raised and the quality of these hostels improved. Steps should be taken to universalise primary education and expand secondary education. Special measures to curb the drop-out rate among SCs should be undertaken.

9. AGRICULTURAL WORKERS: The Minimum Wages Act for agricultural workers must be stringently implemented throughout the country. A comprehensive bill for agricultural workers is another long-standing demand and it must be enacted without delay. Homestead land must be provided for SCs, STs and agricultural workers.

10. RURAL EMPLOYMENT GUARANTEE SCHEME: The National Rural Employment Guarantee Act must be strictly implemented all over the country by involving the people, their mass organisations and the panchayati raj institutions. It should be extended to all districts and also to urban areas of the country.

11. PUBLIC DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM: The public distribution system must be universalised to ensure food to all. Until this is done, BPL ration cards must be issued to all poor families, many of whom are from SCs and STs. The grain under the BPL scheme should be made available at Antyodaya prices.

12. CREDIT: Agricultural credit to peasants and agricultural workers must be made available at 4 % rate of interest. For SCs and STs in both rural and urban areas, credit facilities should be expanded and the credit given at concessional interest rates.

13. BONDED LABOUR AND CHILD LABOUR: The total liberation and full rehabilitation of bonded labourers must be ensured. The pernicious practice of child labour must be abolished and children properly rehabilitated and educated. Similarly, total liberation and full rehabilitation must be ensured for Safaqi Karmacharis who are engaged in scavenging.

14. SCAVENGERS: Ensure total liberation and full rehabilitation for scavengers (safai karamcharis), ban engagement of contract labour in safai services and other services where SC and ST numerically predominate and instead introduce necessary improvements by involving such Karamcharis; and reactivate the Central Monitoring Committee for Liberation and Rehabilitation of Safai Karamcharis and State, Municipal and District Level communities.

15. INTERCASTE MARRIAGES: Intercaste marriages should be encouraged by giving special subsidized housing and other facilities to married couples immediately after their marriage. We should consciously try to uphold such inter-caste marriages and make them an event of big social participation and sanction.